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Abstract: Existing research suggests that both natural resource abundance and 
scarcity are likely to increase the risk of interstate and domestic conflict. Two 
crucial aspects, however, have largely been neglected in the existing literature: (1) 
the analysis of international crises (i.e. non-violent conflicts) and (2) the effects of 
different market conditions of energy resources. Especially a growing number of 
market participants can affect the strategic value of natural resources and, thus, 
the incentives for international crisis initiation. It is argued that different market 
structures make countries to adopt either aggressive or more peaceful behavior 
towards other states, and this is why I empirically then disaggregate fossil fuels 
along with the market that they belong to. This study examines 179 countries at 
the monadic level since 1980. The results suggest variation on the incentives of 
crisis initiation along the different fossil fuels, while I also correct for potential 
endogeneity issues.
Keywords: international crisis, natural resource, endogeneity, instrumental 
variable
1  Introduction
Often literature employs the term “petro-aggression” to show that major oil 
exporters are more likely to engage in crises when oil prices are high (Friedman 
2009). In other words, oil rents reduce “the leader’s risk of domestic punishment 
for foreign policy adventurism” (Colgan 2013, 161) and thus, provide incentives to 
engage in international crises.
Other literature suggests that the increasing globalization of energy markets 
(Goldthau and Witte 2009) and the increasing competition in certain segments of 
oil production (Hughes and Long 2015) has changed states’ behavior in the inter-
national system. These changing market conditions often decrease the incentive 
*Corresponding author: Zorzeta Bakaki, ETH Zürich, Center for Comparative and International 
Studies, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland, Phone: +41 4463 20264,  
E-mail: zorzeta.bakaki@ir.gess.ethz.ch
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:48 PM
174      Zorzeta Bakaki
for foreign policy adventurism because consumers are able to substitute unreli-
able suppliers.
This study builds on the idea that market incentives matter (Månsson 2014) 
by systematically analyzing whether fossil fuel exporters1 tend to engage more 
often in international crises. I extend the framework developed by Colgan (2013) 
within the framework of “producer politics”. I introduce a “rents-pacification” 
argument that suggests that fossil fuel exporters do not risk their fossil revenues 
in order to get engaged in a crisis.
I examine the opportunity costs associated with assertive behavior of export-
ers across three market structures: (1) monopoly, (2) oligopoly and (3) free market. 
Based on the rates of fossil fuel rents and the market competition, gas represents a 
stylized example for a monopoly (very few competitors if not only one competitor) 
(Gordon et al. 2003; Henderson and Pirani 2014; Saidu 2008), oil for an oligopoly 
(a few competitors) (Cologni and Manera 2014) and coal for a free market struc-
ture (many competitors) (Böhringer and Rutherford 2002). Under conditions of 
monopoly, I expect the domination of a “petro-aggression” mechanism, because 
states have relatively low opportunity costs of initiating a crisis. Under conditions 
of oligopoly, it dominates a “rents-pacification” mechanism, as exporters have to 
face the possibility of consumers switching to other suppliers. Finally, under free 
market conditions, I expect that the opportunity costs of initiating a crisis are low 
since free market products are easily accessible and inexpensive.
There is little systematic research and inclusive empirical findings, linking 
fossil fuels and international crises onset (Bove et al. 2015; Koubi et al. 2014; Sova-
cool 2014). Apart from making a general contribution to this strand of research, 
this study: (1) systematically tests the probability of states’ crises initiation, (2) 
disaggregates fossil fuels according to different market structures and introduces 
the “rents-pacification” argument, and (3) solves the potential endogeneity bias, 
by proposing an instrumental variable.2
Energy fossil fuels’ rents of different economic markets have an impact on 
states’ choice of initiating a crisis. The type of the market that each product 
belongs to determines the direction of the outcome. That is, exporters of monopo-
listic and free market products appear with an aggressive policy behavior whilst 
exporters of other markets (oligopoly) consider potential loses of their revenues 
when triggering a crisis.
1 For simplicity reasons I use the word exporters throughout the text but this also refers to states 
with domestic profits from fossil fuel rents.
2 Instrumental variable approach to account for endogeneity was also utilized by Ramsay (2011) 
and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009).
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2   Energy resources and paths to international 
crisis
A state initiates a crisis only if it expects more gains through crises rather than 
through other means (Bueno de Mesquita 1980; Powell 2006; Reiter 2003; Wagner 
2000). The key to understanding the incentives of the energy rents countries is to 
think about the opportunity costs associated with different paths of crisis initia-
tion. Along the same lines, trade might increase the opportunity costs of conflicts 
and thus lead to more peaceful relations (Hegre et al. 2010; Oneal and Russett 
1999). Nonetheless, under certain market conditions, (e.g. trade asymmetries) 
trade can also fuel conflicts (Barbieri 1996; Garfinkel et al. 2008).
To further our understanding of potential opportunity costs that fossil-fuel 
countries have to face when initiating an international crisis, I relate the oppor-
tunity costs to different market structures. I classify the market conditions by the 
number of competitors in the market: (1) monopoly (one dominant exporter), (2) 
oligopoly (a few dominant exporters) and (3) free market (many exporters). I base 
my theoretical argument on the presumption that there are always many consum-
ers in the market, and I develop the following three scenarios.
In an oligopolistic market (oil rents) the major exporter is uncertain about 
the opportunity costs of initiating a crisis against another state, as the clients 
might still have a few alternative oil exporters. In this scenario the consumer 
states can interpret initiation of an international crisis as a threat to their sup-
plies and can decide to switch to another exporter. If a major consumer or many 
consumers switch to another supplier, it means a significant loss of revenues for 
the exporter. Consequently, under these market conditions the major exporters 
might prefer to keep political stability in order to protect their revenues. Thus, 
in this case instead of petro-aggression, I expect the dominance of a rents-paci-
fication behavior.
In a monopolistic market (gas rents) a major exporter has relatively low 
opportunity costs of initiating a crisis against another state, as there is not alter-
native exporter in the market. The exporter state can assume that other consum-
ers do not have a credible alternative and the prospect of switching to another 
exporter and thus, the revenues will not be affected by the country’s aggressive 
foreign policy behavior. Additionally, given the strategic value of energy (Yergin 
2006), the dominance in the energy market might be easily transposed into politi-
cal or military power preponderance, thus creating more incentives to initiate an 
international crisis.
In a free market (coal rents) a major exporter takes smaller share of the 
market and thus generally smaller revenues as compared to monopolistic or 
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oligopolistic markets.3 Smaller revenues are then associated with lower opportu-
nity costs when initiating a crisis. In a free market where many states cover their 
needs for coal by their own domestic production, losing a few consumers who 
do not approve of a potential aggressive foreign policy behavior might not hurt 
economically the exporter state. Hence, under free market conditions exporters 
will be less concerned about their reputational damage among the consumers, 
and will, therefore, initiate more international crises.
Based on the aforementioned considerations I propose the following 
hypotheses:
H1: Countries with high oil rents do not initiate international crises (oligopolistic market con-
ditions).
H2: Countries with high gas rents initiate international crises (monopolistic market condi-
tions).
H3: Countries with high coal rents initiate international crises (free market conditions).
3  Methodological approach
For this analysis I employ the actor level data of the International Crisis Behavior 
(ICB) Project for 179 countries from 1980 to 2006. A recent crisis in the dataset is 
the regime change in Iraq, which was triggered by the US in 2002 with the involve-
ment of the United Kingdom (UK). The year 2002 is thus coded as a crisis year 
for Iraq, USA and UK. Meanwhile, 2003 is not a crisis year in the dataset as the 
crisis was escalated to war. Although a dyadic level of analysis would account 
for the relations of pairs of states in the market, the ultimate goal of this study 
is to examine whether there is a difference across the type and the quantity of 
the energy goods that countries export and their incentives to initiate an interna-
tional crisis.
3.1  Crisis initiation
Existing literature indicates that the relation between interstate crises and energy 
natural resources remains rarely analyzed (Koubi et al. 2012). Due to the decrease 
3 Given that many countries produce coal themselves, the export rates of coal are rather low and 
therefore the total revenues are also smaller.
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of international armed conflict (Gleditsch and Pickering 2014), I examine the 
impact of energy resources in international crises and move beyond an exami-
nation of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data (Ghosn et al. 2004). The 
dependent variable, crisis initiation, indicates the trigger of a crisis by a state 
actor in a specific year.4 It is a binary variable that is coded 1 for crisis initiation (0 
otherwise). I use the monadic version of the International Crisis Behavior dataset 
(ICB) (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010).
3.2  Fossil fuel rents
Smith (forthcoming) proposes a measurement of “rent leverage” computed by 
dividing fuel income per capita with the purchasing power parity (PPP)-corrected 
GDP per capita. In other words, the measure employed by Smith is highly linked 
to the average citizen’s livelihood. This, in turn, can impact on domestic politi-
cal stability. While this measure might indeed be appropriate for the analysis of 
domestic mechanisms that lead to political instability and domestic conflict, for 
the purposes of this study, I opt for a simple measure that only refers to the rev-
enues made by fossil fuels. That is, I measure fossil fuel rents as the percentage of 
GDP that is in GDP 2005 prices. Ultimately, this measure focuses on state capacity 
per se that could potentially have some impact on international crises. The theo-
retical framework suggests that certain market conditions have a restrictive effect 
on aggressive foreign policy behavior, regardless whether rents are used to boost 
patronage or not. Thus, I employ the World Bank’s indicators for oil, gas and coal, 
which are estimated through the difference between the values of production at 
world prices and total costs of production (The World Bank Indicators 2015).
3.3  Instrumental variable
Endogeneity is a major methodological problem in the study of the relationship 
between natural resources and crises (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Koubi 
et al. 2012; Lujala 2009; Mitchell and Thies 2012; Ross 2006). Economic and politi-
cal factors that are meant to explain the dependent variable of interest (crisis 
initiation) are likely to affect the main explanatory variables (fossil fuels) as well. 
In order to address this endogeneity problem, this study employs an instrumental 
model approach.
4 Refer to the Appendix for a list of the countries included in the sample indicating whether they 
initiated a crisis between 1980 and 2006.
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A valid instrument is a variable that is correlated with the key independent 
variable, but at the same time it should be uncorrelated with the error term. In 
turn, this can resolve the problems that measurement error, omitted variable bias, 
and simultaneous causation create – “endogeneity bias” (Ramsay 2011). That is, 
an instrumental variable replaces the problematic independent variable with a 
substitution variable that is uncontaminated by error or unobserved factors that 
affect the outcome. The literature offers a series of instruments aiming to solve 
potential endogeneity bias in the study of natural resources.5
For the purposes of this analysis, I employ the terrain quality as an instru-
ment. Two major conditions have to be satisfied for an instrument to provide 
consistent parameter estimates: (1) the instrument has to be exogenous to inter-
national crisis initiation (dependent variable) and (2) it has to be related to 
changes in fossil fuel rents (core explanatory items).
Arguing that terrain quality does not affect the probability of crisis initiation 
satisfies the first condition. Civil war research indicates that terrain quality is a 
factor influencing intrastate conflict, because it allows rebels to hide from the 
stronger government forces, thus addressing the power asymmetry between state 
and non-state actors (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006). That said, there is no obvious argument for why terrain quality 
should affect the likelihood of international crisis initiation. To be clear: while 
there are arguments linking domestic conflict, and its underlying processes, with 
the outbreak of interstate disputes (Salehyan 2008), none of the arguments in the 
literature refers to terrain quality. Hence, I can consider the variable on terrain 
quality as an exogenous factor and, in fact, an unrelated determinant of interna-
tional crisis.
Regarding the second condition, the terrain quality must be related to the 
fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal). To this end, I consider a basic parameter of fossil 
fuel rents, i.e. the method of transportation as a link between our instrument and 
fossil fuel rents. I expect that the less difficult the transportation of a product, the 
higher the rents that it may generate. Oil, gas, and coal are mostly transported 
using trucks, trains, and pipelines. Transportation is fairly easy and cheap when 
a country’s terrain is approachable. Pipelines, for instance, are considered the 
5 For example, Ramsay (2011) examines the relationship between resource income and politi-
cal freedom employing the occurrence of natural disasters as an instrument. Along the same 
lines, Tsui (2011) examines the long-term effect of discovering oil, and uses oil discoveries as an 
instrument for oil wealth. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) explore the nature of the causal link 
between resources and the onset of war, using a set of exogenous instruments such as geographi-
cal variables (i.e. distance to the nearest coast), the average openness to trade and government 
system.
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safest method of fuels’ transportation. Pipelines are located away from the woods 
and forested areas. However, rough or mountainous terrain might constitute a 
problem for the construction of pipelines; it might be either not feasible to con-
struct a pipeline at all or too expensive. For the aforementioned reasons, terrain 
quality is likely to be strongly associated with fossil fuel rents.
Table 1 summarizes the measurement and sources for all variables included 
in the analysis and Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics of all variables.
4  Empirical analysis
I first present probit models (Tables  3–5) that examine a direct relationship 
between crisis initiation and fossil fuels. I, however, expect that the results 
obtained through probit estimations be biased because fossil fuel exports are 
endogenous to international crises (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Koubi et al. 
2012; Lujala 2009; Ross 2006). To obtain robust results I apply an instrumental 
variable approach (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009; Ramsay 2011) and compute 
probit models with endogenous regressors (ivprobit). Thus, I proceed with the 
analysis of the instrumental models (Tables 3–5) and I present second stage 
results for ivprobit. Considering the structure of the instrumental model, I employ 
a test that examines the magnitude of the endogenous coefficients’ effect (oil, gas 
and coal rents). Hence, I implement a robust postestimation test for instrumental 
models provided by Mikusheva and Poi (2006); see also Finlay and Magnusson 
2009). This robust-instrumental variable test (“rivtest”) examines whether the 
coefficient of an endogenous variable (oil, gas and coal rents) is different from 0 
(null hypothesis). For the instrumental-variable probit, the rivtest calculates the 
minimum distance version of the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test statistic (a joint test of 
the structural parameter) and it presents the Wald test. A statistically significant 
value for both measures suggests that the coefficient of the endogenous variable 
is different from 0, which provides strong evidence in turn that the instrument 
is suitable. Inconsistent results across the two measures (AR and Wald) may – 
but do not have necessarily – point to weak instrument, as the Wald test can be 
unsuitable for weak instruments (not the AR test, though). The AR test is a more 
conservative statistic.
When examining the impact of oil and coal rents on crisis initiation, both 
measures (AR and Wald) are significant. This indicates that the results presented 
in the instrumental models (Tables 3 and 5) are robust. Coming to the impact of 
gas on crisis initiation, the AR and Wald tests are not consistently significant, 
which may affect – but not necessarily – the robustness of the results of the IV 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max
International crisis initiation   4698  0.04  0.19  0  1
Oil rents (lag)   3954  4.30  10.67  0.00  78.93
Gas rents (lag)   4275  0.73  3.26  0.00  64.90
Coal rents (lag)   4327  0.05  0.30  0.00  6.85
GDPln (lag)   4280  8.35  1.18  4.90  11.52
Democracy (lag)   3643  1.50  7.34  –10  10
Borders   4324  5.81  3.40  0  29
Military Strength (lag)   4238  0.01  0.01  0  0.08
Military expenses ln (lag)   3533  12.70  4.88  –6.68  20.02
Openness (lag)   4267  4.61  12.30  –0.02  305.20
IGO (lag)   4151  55.07  21.69  1  129
Quality of terrain (instrumental variable)  3923  3.06  2.49  0  6
model presented in Table 4. To provide further evidence that the terrain quality 
indicator is indeed an exogenous item, I also provide a reduced form model 
(Table 6) that examines directly the relationship between the dependent variable 
of interest (crisis initiation) and the instrumental variable (terrain quality). The 
results show that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two 
measures. That is, I am confident that in the IV-probit regression, I can employ 
the terrain quality for oil, gas and coal rents as an instrument in the selection 
equation.
Model 2 in Table 3 shows that countries with oil rents are statistically signifi-
cant associated with crisis initiation. The probability of crisis initiation decreases 
with oil rents. I also calculated substantive effects in the form of predicted prob-
abilities. When examining these, the probability of crisis initiation is around 15% 
for the minimum value of oil rents; conversely, the risk of triggering a crisis drops 
by 5%-points, when moving to the maximum of the oil rents item. These findings 
are in line with the theoretical argument above: states with insignificant revenues 
might trigger a crisis. The underlying assumption is that countries with insignifi-
cant revenues might trigger a crisis in order to challenge the stability of the energy 
market.
With regard to gas rents (Table 4), I find that states having a monopoly are 
more likely to initiate a crisis, knowing that there is unlikely to be much damage 
to their fuel revenues (Model 2). Indeed, the substantive effect of gas rents empha-
sizes that the maximum value of gas rents is associated with a conflict initiation 
risk of 37%.
Rents from a free market product, such as coal (Table 5), increase the prob-
ability of crisis initiation, as the damage of the revenues would be smaller (Model 
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Table 3: Crisis initiation: effects of oil rents (oligopolistic market) (1980–2006).
 
 
(Model 1)
Probit
 
 
(Model 2)
IV Probit
Oil rents (lag)   0.00  –0.07**
  (0.00)  (0.02)
   
GDP ln (lag)   –0.14**  0.05
  (0.06)  (0.11)
Democracy (lag)   0.02*  –0.03
  (0.00)  (0.02)
   
Borders   0.01  0.05*
  (0.01)  (0.02)
Military strength (lag)   16.39**  10.11
  (6.48)  (6.60)
Military expenses ln (lag)  0.08**  0.14**
  (0.03)  (0.02)
   
Openness (lag)   0.01  –0.01
  (0.00)  (0.00)
IGO (lag)   –0.00  –0.01**
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
t   –0.12*  –0.10*
  (0.05)  (0.04)
   
t2   0.00  0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
t3   –0.00  –0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
Constant   –1.18**  –2.77**
  (0.44)  (0.47)
N   3036  2783
Pseudo R2   0.16 
Wald χ2   150.68**  295.27**
All explanatory variables except the borders are lagged by 1 year.
Standard errors in parentheses **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
2). The substantive effects indicate that states with high coal revenues (maximum 
value of that variable) have a probability of about 90% to initiate a crisis (holding 
all other variables constant at their means), while states characterized by the 
lowest value of coal revenues have risk of triggering a crisis of around 75%.
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Table 4: Crisis initiation: effects of gas rents (monopolistic market) (1980–2006).
  (Model 1)
Probit
  (Model 2)
IV Probit
Gas rents (lag)   –0.05  0.25**
  (0.03)  (0.03)
   
GDP ln (lag)   –0.16**  –0.10**
  (0.06)  (0.02)
Democracy (lag)   0.02*  0.03**
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
Borders   0.02  –0.03**
  (0.02)  (0.00)
Military strength (lag)   17.27**  21.51**
  (6.58)  (4.73)
Military expenses ln (lag)  0.08**  –0.03
  (0.03)  (0.04)
Openness (lag)   0.01  –0.01**
  (0.01)  (0.01)
IGO (lag)   –0.00  0.01**
  (0.00)  (0.01)
   
t   –0.11*  –0.05
  (0.07)  (0.04)
   
t2   0.00  0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
t3   –0.00  –0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
Constant   1.18**  1.04*
  (0.45)  (0.50)
N   3014  2776
Pseudo R2   0.16 
Wald χ2   144.91**  648.19**
All explanatory variables except the borders are lagged by 1 year.
Standard errors in parentheses ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Coming to the control variables, the results show that GDP per capita affects 
the risk of crisis initiation differently across markets. That is, wealthier countries 
are less likely to initiate a crisis in the model that focuses on gas. The results 
suggest that the impact of GDP per capita might differ as soon as we consider the 
impact of oil and coal rents that, however, mirrors much of the earlier research.
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Table 5: Crisis initiation: effects of coal rents (competitive market) (1980–2006).
  (Model 1)
Probit
  (Model 2)
IV Probit
Coal rents (lag)   0.18  3.07**
  (0.10)  (0.16)
   
GDP ln (lag)   –0.16**  –0.05
  (0.06)  (0.06)
Democracy (lag)   0.02*  –0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
Borders   0.01  –0.03**
  (0.01)  (0.00)
Military strength (lag)   20.09**  21.67**
  (6.56)  (5.04)
Military expenses ln (lag)  0.06*  –0.07
  (0.03)  (0.04)
Openness   0.00  –0.01**
  (0.00)  (0.00)
IGO (lag)   –0.01  0.02**
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
t   –0.11*  0.01
  (0.05)  (0.04)
   
t2   0.00  –0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
t3   –0.00  0.00
  (0.00)  (0.00)
   
Constant   –1.02**  –0.17
  (0.44)  (0.36)
N   3021  2783
Pseudo R2   0.16 
Wald χ2   145.11**  3356.89**
All explanatory variables except the borders are lagged by 1 year.
Standard errors in parentheses **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
Moreover, countries’ military capabilities and military expenses positively 
affect crisis initiation almost consistently across the models. For instance, the 
average elasticity of military capabilities across all models is 0.14. The average 
elasticity of military expenses across all models is 0.70. Similarly, more member-
ships in international organizations are associated with a higher likelihood of 
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Table 6: Crisis initiation and terrain quality (reduced form model) (1980–2006).
  (Model 1)
Probit
Quality of the terrain   0.07
  (0.04)
GDP ln (lag)   –0.20**
  (0.06)
Democracy (lag)   0.02*
  (0.00)
Borders   0.00
  (0.00)
Military strength (lag)   17.84**
  (6.40)
Military expenses ln (lag)  0.12**
  (0.03)
Openness (lag)   0.00
  (0.00)
IGO (lag)   –0.00
  (0.00)
t   –0.13**
  (0.05)
t2   0.00
  (0.00)
t3   –0.00
  (0.00)
Constant   –1.53**
  (0.46)
N   2872
Pseudo R2   0.18
Wald χ2   169.18**
All explanatory variables except the quality of terrain and borders are lagged by 1 year. 
 Standard errors in parentheses **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
crisis initiation (in the models on gas and coal rents), which mirrors the underly-
ing rationale of states being more involved in international affairs to be involved 
in more low-intensity conflict. That said, when examining the effect of oil rents, 
states with fewer memberships are more likely to initiate crisis.
Furthermore, I find that openness is a significantly positive indicator of 
crisis initiation in the model on coal while it has significantly negative impact 
on crisis initiation in the model on gas rents. Nevertheless, openness is not sta-
tistically significant to crisis initiation in the model on oil rents. Shared borders 
are usually associated with a better opportunity for crisis (oil rents), and I find 
some evidence for this albeit not consistently across the different estimations. 
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The findings, finally, highlight that democracies seem to be prone to crisis initia-
tion (gas rents). The democracy effect is statistically insignificant in the models 
on oil and coal rents.
The overall results illustrate what are the actors that are likely to trigger a crisis 
based on the fossil fuel product they produce and thus make income. In an attempt 
to examine the different market structures of fossil fuels with regards to crisis ini-
tiation, the results indicate that free markets and monopolies have a higher prob-
ability of triggering a crisis due to the low associated opportunity costs with energy 
revenues. In essence, these markets are placed at the extremes of the market struc-
ture. A monopoly (gas) faces little competition issues, if not at all (see also Gordon 
et al. 2003; Henderson and Pirani 2014; Saidu 2008). Strictly speaking, a monopoly 
consists of only one producer. However, the general development of fossil fuel pro-
duction allows few countries to produce small quantities of gas as well (e.g. Italy, 
Denmark) (Glachant et al. 2013). And this is precisely the reason why gas can be 
referred to a “clumsy” monopoly. This is similar to the case of oil that few decades 
ago belonged to a “clumsy” monopoly, before it switched to an oligopoly market 
(Adelman 2004). Yet, when only one state is the major exporter of a fossil fuel (i.e. 
gas), we still refer to a monopoly. Although, a free market (coal) is usually very com-
petitive, the reality that there are many producers makes the product less desirable 
and as a result of a lower importance for a country’s revenues. On the contrary, a 
country of an oligopolistic product (oil) deals with a lot of uncertainty due to the 
amount of producers and the excessive need for the product. Therefore, the rev-
enues from an oligopolistic market product are not stable and often very subtle 
to the market’s fluctuations. This makes countries that rely on oil revenues more 
careful and rather risk averse towards their relations with other states.
5  Conclusion
Previous studies have considered different types of resources as influential to 
conflict (i.e. oil and diamonds) (Ross 2006). With a few exceptions (Goenner 
2010) the different levels of competition across the major energy markets have 
not been explicitly addressed by the existing literature. For this reason I have 
disaggregated the energy resources according to the level of competition in the 
markets, and examined the association with crisis initiation.
The results indicate that countries with oil rents acknowledge the instability 
of the oligopolistic market that oil belongs to, and they choose a pacifier’s behav-
ior in their relations with other states. Countries with rents from monopolistic 
and free markets products -although very different structures- behave similarly 
with a positive relationship to crisis initiation. The features of the markets allow 
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the actors to adopt aggressive behavior, given that their energy revenues are not 
affected, either because there is no competition (gas) or because the very high 
levels of competition (coal) generate small benefits. The major assumption behind 
this link is that actors before initiating a crisis calculate the potential damage. In 
these markets the damage of the fuels revenues is ultimately small because there 
are no many alternative gas exporters in the market and because there is very 
little need for coal imports. Therefore, “the resource backed aggression” (Colgan 
2010) is reversed to “market restricted behavior” and thus, pacifier’s behavior for 
fossil-fuel states of an oligopolistic market (i.e. oil).
A prominent example of a major monopoly as a gas supplier is Russia. That 
said, the Russian market share as the dominant gas supplier has been declining 
since 1997 and overall the market has been exhibiting an increasing competition. 
Therefore, the expectation is to see a decline in crisis initiation also by the major 
gas exporters in the future due to the change of the market structure.
In general, the study of states’ relations over fossil fuels is related to the lit-
erature on the pacifying effects of trade between states (e.g. Polachek et al. 1999; 
Reuveny and Kang, 1998). For example, research generally shows that trade 
ties between states improve their bilateral relations (Barbieri 1996; Oneal and 
Russett 1999), although more disaggregated work (e.g. Dorussen 2006) empha-
sizes that the composition of trade flows (i.e. “what you trade”) ultimately influ-
ences whether we see a pacifying or conflictive effect. Specifically, these latter 
studies find that there is variation across the types of commodities as they are 
“not uniform in their characteristics and can vary significantly in terms of their 
substitutability” (Goenner 2010, 550).
The present study examined the impact of oil rents on crisis initiation; yet, it 
is still worth examining whether governments also consider anticipated fossil fuel 
rents before initiating a crisis. That is, such a research question can be examined 
with prediction and forecasting techniques. In addition, while natural energy 
resources remain an important factor of states’ behavior and relations, renewable 
energy resources might change the scenarios by increasing market competition 
and therefore, the interests of major exporters and consumers, respectively.
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